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GENERAL DEMURRER-ULTIMATE FACT-CONCLUSIONS OF LAWINJUNCTION-Rozman vs. Allen et al.-No. 13819-Decided

May 17, 1937-District Court of Gunnison County-Hon.
George W. Bruce, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Defendants in error were plaintiffs below, and plaintiff in
error was defendant below. The parties herein will be denominated as
they were in the trial court. Action was instituted by the plaintiff to
enjoin the obstruction by fences of a road which crossed the defendant's
stock-raising homestead. A temporary injunction was granted, and,
after answer was filed, a general demurrer was interposed by the plaintiff
which was sustained and the injunction made permanent. Defendant
elected to stand on his answer as amended. In 1930 the defendant filed
upon a tract of land which was traversed by a driveway which the plaintiff and others had been using for many years in moving cattle back and
forth to the unappropriated public domain. The Gunnison County
Cattle Growers' Assn. petitioned the Secretary of Interior to establish a
new driveway, which petition was granted. The substance of the litigation was whether the defendant, under the circumstances, was entitled
to fence off the old driveway, thereby compelling the plaintiff and others
to use the new driveway in moving-their cattle.
HELD: 1. Plaintiff's contention that the allegation in the defense
that the second driveway was established in lieu and instead of all previous routes or trails used prior to its establishment is a conclusion of law
is not correct. Under the facts and circumstances it was an allegation of
ultimate fact which the defendant was entitled to prove.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Young concur.
WILLS-TESTAMENTARY

CAPACITY--SIGNATURES-EXPERT

WIT-

NESSES-Peterson, Executor of the Estate of Clara B. Stitzer vs.
Frank A. Stitzer-No. 13991-Decided May 17, 1937-District
Court of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: On May 4. 1935, the 65 year old testatrix made her will;
she died the next day. The will was lodged in the County Court for
probate and was contested by her 95 year old husband, Frank A. Stitzer,
who will herein be designated as the contestant, on the grounds of lack
of testamentary capacity and undue influence. A jury found it to be
her last will and testament. On appeal to the District Court a jury
returned a verdict that the will was not her last will and testament.
Robert W. Peterson, the proponent of the will, and Stitzer were named
in the will as executors. Testatrix became ill and went to a sanitarium.
The disease which she had does not affect the mind. The day prior to
her death she told Peterson she wanted to make a will. She dictated
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what she wanted, and when it was completed and read to her, she responded "yes" to the question if that was what she wanted. This all
took place in the presence of disinterested persons, who state that she was
mentally competent at the time. She attempted to sit up in bd so as to
sign the will which was before her. The result of her attempt was an
illegible scrawl. Contestant, for the purpose of comparison of the signature of testatrix on the will with her signature made under other conditions, introduced, over the objection of proponent, a check on the Colorado National Bank, signed by her in January, 1935. Proponent assigns
error to the admission of this exhibit, contending that it was equivalent
to telling the jury that testatrix did not sign her will and did not have
mental capacity to make a will.
HELD: I. If the testatrix's mental conception of what she was
doing was clear, and she desired to sign the will, her participation in an
attempt to sign it, however slight, renders the signature sufficient.
2.
The opinion of an expert is entitled to but little weight when
opposed to the facts and circumstances appearing at the time, and surrounding the making and execution of a will.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
QUIET TITLE-NOTICE-KNOWN ADDRESS, WHAT CONSTITUTESTAX DEED-MININCG---TAX SALES-Walter vs. Harrison-No.
13885-Decided May 24, 1937-District Court of Boulder
Count y-Hon. Claude C. Coffin, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:
Action was brought by defendant in error as plaintiff
below to quiet title to certain lode mining claims. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, quieting title to him in the premises in
dispute. Plaintiff's title is grounded upon a treasurer's deed based on a
tax sale certificate for 1928 taxes. Application was made and the tax
deed, which is conceded to be valid on its face, was issued in 1933. The
principal attack on the validity of the deed is based upon the alleged
failure of the County Treasurer to comply with the statutory requirements in not making diligent inquiry to ascertain the address of one
Hallet, a prominent person in the county and state, in order that copy
of the published notice of the application could be sent him by mail.
HELD:
1. A tax deed which is valid on its face is prima facie
evidence of the regularity of all of the prerequisites necessary to its
execution and delivery.
2.
It is the duty of the County Assessor to prepare the tax rolls
and give the names and addresses of the owners thereon, and such address
is a known address within the meaning of the statute, and the Treasurer
is entitled to rely on their being accurate.
3.
Extrinsic evidence is admissable to augment the tax deed in
ascertaining whether or not the Treasurer had complied with the statute.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Bakke concur.
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-

DISCLOSURE -

FRAUD--EQUITY-LAW

-Miller vs. Goff-No. 13997-Decided May 24, 1937-District
Court of Denver-Hon.James C. Starkweather, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The parties will be mentioned as plaintiff and defendant,
as they appeared in the trial court. Plaintiff and others were attempting
to acquire the rights to prior locators on claims in oil fields in Wyoming.
The Midwest Oil Company obtained a lease from the Federal Government including the above claims and was desirous of acquiring the rights
existing by virtue of prior claims, its lease being subject to these rights
under the provisions of the Federal "Leasing Act."
Plaintiff and his
then associates enlisted the aid of defendant in acquiring the claims and
disposing of them to the Midwest Oil Company. Defendant was confident that he could accomplish the sale through F. G. Bpnfils of Denver.
To establish their interests the parties, including defendant, entered into
an agreement whereby each was to share and share alike. A sale was
made to the oil company through Bonfils, who, it is alleged by plaintiff,
was paid $148,500, and who, with his attorney and the defendant,
distributed the money on the basis of $125,000. Distribution was made
June 1, 1924, and the entire matter so remained until August of 1931,
when a widow of one of the parties learned that $148,500 had been paid
in the settlement instead of $125,000.
Plaintiff brought suit, joining
with him the widow's interest, against Bonfils in equity for an accounting. Bonfils died and his executors paid plaintiff $7,500 in settlement.
Plaintiff then sued defendant, who had received in excess of what he
should have received, for a money judgment.
HELD: 1. The suit against Bonfils was in equity, and the action
against Miller was one at law. The remedies plaintiff sought in the
two actions were consistent and independent and the compromise in the
Bonfils suit in no way prejudiced the defendant, Miller.
2.
The three-year statute of. limitations is not a bar to an action
if the defendant is charged with the duty of a full and complete disclosure
to plaintiff of all the details of the transaction. Failing therein, he will
not be permitted to assert lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
WATER RIGHTS-RES JUDICATA-DEPARTURE--STATUTES---STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-ESTOPPEL -ADVERSE
USE-OWNERSHIP-Luxen vs. The Town of Rifle et al.-No. 13961-Decided
May 24, 1937-District Court of Garfield County-Hon. John
T. Shumate, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Plaintiff brought suit in the trial court to enjoin the town
of Rifle from using more than its alleged allotment of water from Beaver
Creek in said county. Demurrers were filed by defendants, which were
overruled and a temporary restraining order was entered, after which the
defendants answeed, setting up thg defenses of statutes of limitations,
estoppel, and res judicata.
The replication sought to void these de-
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fenses by setting up the plea of acquisition by adverse use. The defendants then demurred to the replication on the grounds of departure, which
was sustained. Under a decree of 1888, plaintiff was given 65 cubic
feet of water per minute of time for irrigation from the Clausen Ditch
No. 8; and Starke and the town, claiming under the Starke Ditch No.
15, were given 55 cubic feet. The decree further provided that in case
of shortage the two ditches were to have all the water, share and share
alike. In 1890 the decree was changed, giving each 60 feet. In 1906
the town, having acquired the Starke priority, filed a petition with court
to change the point of diversion so the water could be used for town purposes. A decree was entered allowing the diversion, and a stipulation
was entered into to the effect that no one's rights would be considered
interfered with excepting that they shall all be subject to and subsequent
in point of time and right to town's priority as changed by the proceeding. From 1906 to 1932 no one had any occasion to question the provisions of the 1906 decree because there wasn't any shortage of water,
until in 1932 it became necessary for the town to use all of the water.
HELD: 1. A judgment on matters not litigated cannot be res
judicata as to them. The plaintiff's alleged damages never having been
litigated, he has a right to have them determined.
2. Sections 1784, 1785, 1789, C. L. 1921, urged by the town
as the statute of limitations are not applicable, because these sections
limit the power to question the decree only to the right and measure of
diversion.
3. Estoppel is available only against one who consciously acquiesces in something being done to his detriment, the other elements of
estoppel being present.
4. Acquisition of title by adverse user set out in the replication
is not a departure from the plea of general ownership in the complaint,
because evidence to prove adverse user would be receivable in proving
general ownership.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Young concur.
ABSTRACT OF RECORD,--WHAT

IT

MUST CONTAIN-APPEAL

AND

ERROR-Reuss vs. Raleigh Company, Inc.-No. 14068-Decided
May 24, 1937-District Court of Denver-Hon. James C. Starkweather, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action ivas on an open account, for goods and merchandise. Default judgment was entered May 2, 1933. More than three
years later plaintiffs in error moved to vacate for want of jurisdiction
because no summons was served. Their motion was denied and they
brought error.
HELD: 1. The abstract of record must comply with Rule 36 to
be a basis for a consideration of the assignments of error.
2. If the abstract does not set forth the substance of the summons
in question, it is for all practical purposes no abstract.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Knous and Mr.

Justice Holland concur.
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DISBARMENT-PLEA OF NOLO CONTENDERE-PERJURY-DETERMINING CORRECTNESS OF CHARGES-State of Colorado vs. Edi-

son-No. 1411 O-Decided June 1, 193 7--Original Proceedingin
Disbarment-Dismissed.
FACTS: It was charged in the petition that in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, respondent, an
attorney of the Colorado bar, was indicted for the crime of perjury; that
to the charge she entered a plea of nolo contendere, upon which she was
ordered committed to a federal institution for women for one year and
a day, but the order was suspended during respondent's good behavior
for one year. Answering, respondent admitted the return of the indictment, her plea of nolo contendere, the sentence imposed and suspension
thereof, all as charged; but she denied her guilt of the crime of perjury
in the matter of the indictment and said that she entered the plea of nolo
contendere on the advice of counsel, themselves believing her to be innocent, but sensing what they conceived to be a menacing prejudice in the
forum of her trial, and convinced there was grave danger she would fare
illy at the hands of a jury, advised her to enter the plea. The Supreme
Court being of the opinion that the law did not preclude, and justice
required, inquiry in due course as to the truth of the charge of perjury
against respondent, referred the matter to the District Court, with instructions to take testimony and make findings of fact. That court
found that respondent entered the plea of nolo contendere on the advice
of counsel, which, the circumstances considered, conforming to her answer in that regard, the court said was warranted and that the respondent was not guilty of perjuzy, and that she had not otherwise offended
as a member of the bar.
HELD: I. The plea of nolo contendere, when accepted by the
court, is an implied confession of guilt, and, for the purposes of the case
only, equivalent to a plea of guilty, but has no effect beyond the particular case.
2. The Supreme Court, in an original proceeding in disbarment,
is not precluded from determining whether or not the charge and conviction of the respondent, in a court of record, was correct.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
FUTURE INTERESTS-TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS-DUTIES OF HOLDER OF LIFE -ESTATE-LIMITATIONS--PLEADING-MOTIONS-13773-Decided
REMEDIES-Dormer vs. Walker et a.-No.

June 1, 1937-DistrictCourt of Jefferson County-Hon. Samuel
W. Johnson, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: The parties appear here in the same position as in the
court below; Dormer shall be referred to as plaintiff or "remainderman,"
and the defendants as such or as "life tenant" and trustee. Davis conveyed to the predecessor of the defendant trustee certain real property
for the life of the defendant, Walker, with remainder in fee simple to
the plaintiff and her co-tenant, Newton, who was not a party to the
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proceeding. The life tenant and remainderman are children of the
grantor. The deed gave to the trustee the power to rent or lease the said
real estate and required the payment by him from said rental of "all taxes
and assessments, including water tax, that may be levied or assessed
against said property when the same are due," and further provided that
in case said taxes and assessments "are not paid within six months after
the same are due and payable, then and in that case the trust hereby
created and all the rights and benefits of Newton (now Walker, the defendant) shall cease and terminate, and the title to said real estate shall
vest immediately in fee simple, in the remainderman, * * * and they
shall be entitled to the immediate possession thereof."
Neither the
trustee nor the life tenant paid the general taxes and assessments on the
premises for the year 1930, nor the Moffat Tunnel taxes and interest
for the years 1928, 1929, and 1930. After the elapse of more than six
months after the taxes and assessments were due, plaintiff brought suit
in ejectment to secure possession upon the theory that the alleged breach
by the trustee and the life tenant terminated the life estate and entitled
the remainderman to the immediate possession of the property. The
trial court rendered judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants on
their motion. The life tenant contends that the relief to the plaintiff
lies in other legal or equitable proceedings, and does not extend to the
right to terminate the life estate. Also that the provision in the conveyance constitutes a condition subsequent in which case the original
conveyor or her heirs, as owners of the reversionary interest as distinguished from a remainderman, are the only ones to have the power of
termination upon breach of the condition subsequent.
HELD: 1. As a matter of law, even where the instrument creating the life estate is silent as to these items, it is the duty of the owner
of a life estate, who is entitled to receive the rents, issues, and profits
therefrom, to keep paid all current taxes and assessments which, if left
unpaid, may result in a lien effective against the interests subsequent to
the estate for life.
2. An estate for life can be created subject to a special limitation,
a condition subsequent, or an executory limitation or a combination of
these restrictions.
3. The provision terminating the life estate, upon default as was
here provided for the payment of taxes and assessments, amounted to an
executory limitation rather than a condition subsequent.
4. An "executory limitation" is defined as denoting that part of
the language of a conveyance, by virtue of which the interest subject
thereto, upon the occurrence of a stated event, is to be diverted, before the
normal expiration thereof, in favor of another interest in a person other
than the conveyor or his successor in interest.
5.
The defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings admits
the truth of the allegations of the complaint.
6. If the conveyance is silent as to the duty of the life tenant with
respect to the payment of taxes during the period of the life estate, if it
merely imposes the duty or obligation to pay such taxes, then if the life
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tenant fails to discharge his duty, the owners of the future interest in the
land involved are generally limited, depending upon the circumstances
of the case, to the following remedies:
(a)
An action for damages against the life tenant or his personal
representative;
Mandatory injunction requiring the life tenant to perform
(b)
his duty;
(c) Appointment of a receiver to manage and operate the land
and perform the duty;
(d) To impress the life estate with a lien in favor of the remainderman where he has made payment of the item which it was the duty
of the life tenant to pay, and,
(e) Compel the life tenant or his personal representative to reimburse the owner of the future interest for the sums he may expend in the
payment of such taxes or assessments.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Holland concur.
REPLEVIN-STIPULATIONS-INTENT OF THE PARTIES-JURY-FIX-

ING OF AMOUNT OF LIEN-Timpte Brothers vs. Kayser et a.No. 14020-Decided June 1, 1937-DistrictCourt of DenverHon. James C. Starkweather, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The defendants claimed a mechanic's lien for work done
on the motor truck of the plaintiffs, now defendants in error. The
plaintiff tendered in full settlement the sum of $619.81, which was
refused by the defendants. The plaintiffs thereupon brought action to
replevy the truck. Defendants contend that the trial court disregarded
the true nature of the action and erroneously permitted the jury to
enlarge its proper functions by bringing in a verdict determining the
amount of the lien, instead of determining whether the amount tendered
by the plaintiffs was or was not insufficient to satisfy the lien. The
parties entered into a stipulation whereby the replevin and redelivery
bonds, or undertakings, respectively, given in a sum double the value of
the truck were canceled and there was substituted a money deposit by
the plaintiffs in a sum sufficient to satisfy a judgment for the maximum
claim of the lien claimant together with the probable costs and expenses.
Clear provision was made for applying the deposit to payment of such a
judgment and for the return of any unused balance to the plaintiffs.
The controversy arises because of the position taken by the lien claimant,
namely, that the deposit is not to be used for the purpose of paying out
of it the lesser sum fixed by the jury as the correct amount of the lien;
that is, a little over $300 less than the amount claimed by the defendants.
HELD: 1. The intention of the parties was to make the deposit
respond for whatever amount the jury should find to be due the defendants.
2. The stipulation conferred full authority upon the District
Court to do what it did.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.

